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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates whether there has been any convergence in gov-
ernment expenditures. The results obtained, by means of the Tukey 
box-plot,  -convergence  and  conditional  -convergence,  reveal  that 
there is a growing fiscal interdependence among OECD countries. I 
argue that there is strong evidence of a “race to the top” of government 
productive  expenditures  among  OECD  countries  during  the  period 
1970-1997.  The  econometric  analysis  shows  that  aggregate  OECD 
productive expenditures have pressured countries to increase their own 
levels of productive expenditures, which might be indicating a compe-
tition to attract FDI. In contrast, there is no evidence of convergence in 
non-productive government expenditures.  
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1.  Introduction 
Slemrod (2004) recently analyzed the convergence of corporate tax 
rates  and  concluded  that  some  of  this  convergence  is  due  to 
international pressures for tax competition. International economic 
integration might also lead to a convergence process in government 
expenditures.  Keen  and  Marchand  (1997)  elaborate  a  model  in 
which,  in  the  presence  of  mobile  capital,  increasing  competence 
will  encourage  governments  to  over-provide  productive 
expenditures at the expense of utility-enhancing spending. In fact, 
the efficiency hypothesis contends that efficiency and competence 
for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) will lead countries to 
reduce taxation, particularly capital taxes, but also to restructure the 
composition  of  government  expenditure  away  from  social  welfare 
expenditure and towards privately productive public inputs (Tanzi, 
2000).  Governments  may  become  competitors  to  attract  mobile 
factors devoting more resources towards privately productive public 
inputs  such  as  education,  training,  research  and  development  and 
infrastructures. Furthermore, maintaining generous social protection 
systems represents a severe liability for the export sector and the 
domestic sector exposed to import competition in the advent of a 
more competitive global environment. 
 
According  to  the  efficiency  hypothesis,  we  should  expect  a 
convergence towards the highest levels of productive expenditures 
and the lowest levels of social welfare spending. However, Rodrik 
(1998) claims that more open to trade economies are more subject 
to  external  shocks  and,  therefore,  citizens  demand  their 
governments  to  provide  more  social  insurance  to  mitigate  this 
exposure  to  external  risk.  Furthermore,  Scheve  and  Slaughter 
(2006) contend that political support for globalization is associated 
with the protection of the social welfare system. Therefore, is it not 
clear  whether  governments  would  be  able  to  engage  in  a  race 
towards the top levels of productive expenditures and towards the 
bottom  levels of  non-productive expenditures. In this respect, we 
aggregate  the  Classification  of  Functions  of  the  Government 
(COFOG, United Nations 2000) as productive and non-productive 
into  theory-based  categories  following  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), Devarajan et al. (1996) and the empirical evidence provided Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  31 
by Kneller et al. (1999). Government expenditures entering as an 
input in the private production function and having a direct effect 
upon  economic  growth  are  classified  as  productive  expenditures. 
Productive expenditures generally include spending with substantial 
physical or human capital component. Government expenditures not 
entering  in  the  private  production  function  and,  therefore,  not 
affecting  the  steady-state  rate  of  growth  are  considered  non-
productive  expenditures.  Non-productive  expenditures  include 
spending which, nevertheless, might be utility-enhancing as social 
welfare expenditures. 
 
Sanz and Velázquez (2004), find that there has been a convergence 
process  in  the  government  expenditure  composition  by  functions.  
This paper further analyses whether this convergence is due to the 
efficiency pressure of international economic integration, focusing 
on the role of FDI inflows and other countries expenditures in this 
convergence  process.  Section  2  reviews  the  predictions  of  the 
efficiency  hypothesis  on  the  composition  of  government  spending. 
Section 3 evaluates whether there has been a convergence process in 
government expenditures across OECD countries using the Tukey 
box-plots and -convergence. Section 4 adapts the conditional -
convergence  analysis  of  the  income  convergence  literature  to 
examine the role of FDI and interdependence in fiscal policies in 
the government expenditures convergence. Section 5 sets out the 
main conclusions. 
 
 
2.  International economic integration and convergence of gov-
ernment expenditure. 
 
International trade and financial liberalization has led to a growing 
interdependence  of  fiscal  policies.  Particularly,  capital  mobility 
seems to have important implications for the size and composition of 
government spending. In fact, Bernauer and Achini (2000) contend 
that capital mobility rather than trade is the distinguishing feature of 
the  current  phase  of  international  economic  integration.  Capital 
market  mobility  and  international  mobility  of  income  tax-payers 
undercut the fiscal autonomy of nation states (Tanzi, 2000). Capital 
taxes  are  an  important  determinant  of  firms’  location  decisions 
(Devereux  and  Griffith,  1998)  and  therefore  globalization  makes 32  European Political Economy Review  
 
capital taxation more difficult. In fact, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) 
argue that countries are more willing to forgo tax revenues to attract 
FDI  than  to  encourage  domestic  investments.  The  reduction  in 
government revenues does not necessarily lead to a reduction in the 
level of government spending.  However, during the late nineties 
OECD  countries  have  increasingly  implemented  government 
spending  reforms  towards  more  controlled  government  spending 
and  active  deficit  management  (Tanzi  and  Schuknecht,  2000). 
Ardagna (2001) contend that fiscal consolidations that concentrate 
on the expenditure side are more effective at achieving household’s 
welfare  increases  and  long-lasting  reduction  of  public  liabilities 
than  tax-based  adjustments.  Indeed,  Zaghini  (2001)  shows  that 
policymakers have recently shifted their priorities from a past policy 
of deficit financing to one of expenditure reduction policy.  
 
Keen and Marchand (1997) contend that fiscal competition has also 
important implications for the composition of government spending. 
These authors elaborate a model in which capital is perfectly mobile 
across  countries  but  consumers  are  completely  immobile.  Each 
country has an incentive to increase public productive expenditures 
to offer an attractive environment for mobile capital. Oates (1995) 
claims  those  productive  public  expenditures  are  relevant  for 
establishing  a  favourable  business  climate  to  influence  business 
location.  Furthermore,  Figlio  and  Blonigen  (2000)  report  that 
foreign  firms  have  requested  extensive  fund  for  transport  and 
communications infrastructure, training and education programs as 
part  of  location  incentive  packages  in  the  US.  By  increasing 
unilaterally  productive  expenditures,  Keen  and  Marchand  (1997) 
show  that  the  country  also  raises  the  marginal  productivity  of 
private capital inducing a capital inflow and increasing the capital 
tax  base.
1 An  increase  in  productive  expenditures  in  a  country 
imposes negative external effects on the others in form of a capital 
outflow which reduces their tax base, rents and wages. The main 
conclusion is then that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, not only 
the level of aggregate government spending will be inefficient but 
                                                 
1  Nevertheless, if increasing public productive expenditures leads to a significant 
reduction of the labour supply, and the subsequent negative effect on the mar-
ginal product of capital, it might lead to a capital outflow (Keen and Marchand, 
1997). Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  33 
also the composition. Particularly, governments will over-provide 
productive  expenditures  and  under-provide  utility-enhancing 
spending (Keen and Marchand, 1997).  
 
In fact, international economic integration threats the social welfare 
protection  systems  of  OECD  countries.  Most  of  social  welfare 
spending,  including  pension  payments  and  unemployment 
subsidies,  has  a  direct  impact  on  the  cost  of  labour.  Therefore, 
maintaining generous social protection systems represents a severe 
liability  for the export sector and the domestic sector exposed to 
import  competition  in  the  advent  of  a  more  competitive  global 
environment.  Moreover,  lowering  the  levels  of  social  protection 
appears a more useful toll for attracting foreign investment in the 
EU than tax competition. In fact, the EU has taken some measures 
to avoid harmful effects of competition among Member States on 
social protection systems. Along these lines, the Recommendations 
approved by the European Council (94/441/EEC and 92/442/EEC) 
proposed a convergence in the aims and policies related to social 
protection to prevent objectives as the Single Market and the free 
movement of labour being harmed. In contrast, tax competition is 
obfuscated  by  difference  between  tax  systems  and  bases.  Each 
Member State has its own set of rules (which are subject to frequent 
changes),  in  particular  laws  and  conventions  on  financial 
accounting and rules for determining taxable profit. Countries have 
also different arrangements for collection and administration of tax 
and its own network of tax treaties. The fact that UE Member States 
have different company tax systems and tax administrations makes 
of the tax competition in the EU an imperfect type of competition.  
 
Along the lines of the efficiency hypothesis, Cusack (1997) finds 
that  international  financial  integration  decrease  the  size  of 
government expenditures net of defence spending as a share of GDP 
in a panel of 16 OECD countries in the period 1955-1989. Kaufman 
and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) find a negative effect of trade openness 
on social security expenditure and a positive relationship between 
capital liberalization and education and health spending in a sample 
of 14 Latin American countries for the period 1973-1997. Garret 
and Mitchell (2001) find that trade openness reduces the size of the 
public sector, government consumption and income transfers in a 
sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1961-1983, whereas 34  European Political Economy Review  
 
financial openness and the inflows and outflows of FDI reduce the 
size of public sector and consumption. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) 
find a positive relationship between trade openness and the size of 
public consumption in a cross-section of more than 130 developed 
and developing countries over the period 1985-1989. Nevertheless, 
this effect disappears when the size of the countries is also taken 
into account and they conclude that the fact that smaller countries 
have a larger share of public consumption in GDP and are also more 
open  to  trade  accounts  for  the  observed  positive  empirical 
relationship  between  trade  openness  and  government  size.  These 
authors also find evidence of trade openness increasing the share of 
government expenditures devoted to defence, education and public 
investment for a cross-section of more than 100 countries over the 
period 1980-1984.  
 
According  to  the  efficiency  hypothesis,  we  should  expect  a 
convergence  towards  the  highest  levels  of  productive  expenditures 
and  the  lowest  levels  of  social  welfare  spending.  However, 
international economic integration might also increase the demand 
of individuals for social welfare spending preventing governments 
to  follow  the  predictions  of  the  efficiency  hypothesis.  Indeed, 
Rodrik (1998) claims that more open to trade economies are more 
subject  to  external  shocks  and,  therefore,  citizens  demand  their 
governments  to  provide  more  social  insurance  to  mitigate  the 
exposure to external risk. Garret (1998) expands the argument also 
to  capital  mobility  arguing  that  globalization  increases  social 
dislocations and economic insecurity and therefore individuals ask 
governments to shield them from market dislocations. Furthermore, 
Scheve  and  Slaughter  (2006)  contend  that  political  support  for 
globalization is associated with the protection of the social welfare 
system. Therefore maintaining social welfare  must be compatible 
with globalization. In fact, these authors find some evidence that 
more generous labour market policies increase support for free trade 
using data the 1995 International Social Survey Performance (ISSP) 
which includes 16 advanced countries. Iversen and Cusack (2000) 
contend that individuals intensify demands for higher welfare state 
expenditures for insurance against the exposure to risk. However, 
these  authors  claim  that the  employment  losses  in  the  traditional 
sectors generated by the desindustrialization, and not globalization, 
are the driving force generating this perception of risk. Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  35 
  
Along  these  lines,  Hicks  and  Swank  (1992)  find  a  positive  and 
significant influence of trade openness on social welfare effort for a 
sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1960-1982. Quinn 
(1997)  finds  that  capital  account  liberalization  increases  both the 
size of the public sector and social welfare expenditures as a share 
of GDP for a cross-section of 30 and 38 developed and developing 
countries  over  the  period  1974-1989.  Rodrik  (1998)  shows  that 
trade  openness  increases  social  welfare  spending  and  aggregate 
government expenditure  for a cross section of countries over the 
period  1990-1992.  In  particular,  the  interaction  between  trade 
openness and the terms-of-trade seems to be the channel to capture 
the induced risk of an open economy and the subsequent increase in 
the demand for social welfare. Swank (2001) finds a positive effect 
of trade openness on the size of public sector in a sample of 16 
OECD countries over the period 1964-1993. This author also finds 
that  capital  mobility  increases  the  size  of  public  sector,  social 
transfers and public consumption characterized by high corporatism, 
high consensus democracy and low dispersion of authority. Bernauer 
and Achini (2000) find that trade openness increase the size of the 
public  sector  whereas  they  do  not  find  any  significant  effect  of 
capital  mobility  for  a  varying  sample  of  OECD  and  non-OECD 
countries using 5 years average from 1960-1994. Finally, Bretschger 
and Hettich (2002) find that trade openness and the lack of capital 
market  restrictions  increases  social  expenditures  for  a  panel  of  14 
OECD countries for the period 1980-1995.  
 
 
3. Evolution and distribution of government size and composi-
tion in the OECD  
 
This section analyzes the distribution of productive, non-productive 
and  aggregate  government  expenditures  across  OECD  countries. 
We use the classification of the functions of the government expen-
diture into productive and non-productive provided by Kneller et al. 
(1999). These authors grouped the  functions of  the COFOG  into 
productive and non-productive expenditures following the theoreti-
cal models of Barro (1990) and Deverajan et al. (1996). In particu-
lar, Kneller et al. (1999) include the functions of general administra-
tive services, defence, public order, health, education, housing and 36  European Political Economy Review  
 
transport and communications  in the aggregate  of productive  ex-
penditures whereas they classify social security, economic services 
other than transportation and communications and recreational, cul-
tural and religious affairs as non-productive expenditures. These au-
thors find that productive expenditures so defined  increased eco-
nomic growth whereas non-productive expenditures did not signifi-
cantly affect economic growth for a sample of 22 OECD countries 
over the period 1970-1995. Data for government expenditures and 
COFOG classification builds upon OECD publication National Ac-
counts. Volume II: Detailed Tables. This source is chosen because as 
it offers information on the consolidated spending of all levels of gov-
ernment and, in addition, it follows the accrual criterion. 
2 Our sample 
includes 26 countries: all OECD members States, except the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.  
 
The analysis of the distribution of government expenditure will be 
carried out by  means of the  box-plot designed  by Tukey (1977). 
Tukey’s box-plot analysis is a very useful tool for illustrating the 
dynamic  distribution  of  the  size  and  composition  of  government 
spending  among  OECD  countries.  It  easily  shows  the  magnitude 
and sources of the dispersion. Thus, in the horizontal axis of the 
Tukey box-plots, we have considered the averages  for three sub-
periods: the 70’s, 80’s and 1990-1997. We choose these three inter-
vals based on the evolution and scope of the public sector size dur-
ing the period 1970-1997 in the OECD countries (Tanzi and Schuk-
necht, 2000). In the seventies, the public sector expanded rapidly 
continuing the tendency started after World War II. This trend was 
interrupted in the early years of the eighties when public expendi-
ture as a share of GDP became stable as a consequence of the threat 
to the sustainability of public finances at the levels attained in the 
previous sub-period (Oxley et al., 1990). At the beginning of the 
nineties  public  expenditure  increased  its  importance  again  until 
1995, the peak for the whole period, coinciding with the end of the 
economic crisis. Thereafter, there is a reduction in the public ex-
                                                 
2  Data from Eurostat: General Government Accounts and Statistics and the IMF 
publication: Government Finance Statistics, is used on a supplementary basis so as 
to obtain longer statistical series. Although IMF data covers a longer period of 
time, it is not consolidated for all levels of public administrations as a rule and 
uses the cash criterion (see Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 for a discussion on the 
limitations of the data of this publication). Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  37 
penditure share as a result of the fiscal discipline implemented in 
the OECD countries. Certainly, EU Member States signed the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, 1996, which constrained their public defi-
cits and debt levels, whereas the United States adopted the Balanced 
Budget Amendment. In the vertical axis we map the aggregate, pro-
ductive and non-productive expenditures as shares of GDP. The box 
indicates the inter-quartile range containing from the 25th percentile 
to the 75th percentile of the distribution, so that it shows the range 
of expenditure shares that apply to half of the countries. The hori-
zontal lines crossing the boxes locate the medians and the whiskers 
mark upper and lower adjacent values. The upper (lower) adjacent 
value is the largest (smallest) data point that is not greater (lesser) 
than the top (bottom) quartile plus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. 
Box plots also indicate values that lie outside the upper and lower 
adjacent values.  
 
So, as Figure 1 reveals, between the 70’s and the 80’s there was a 
reduction  in  the  inter-quartile  range  in  government  size  across 
OECD countries, but an increase in the length of the whiskers. The 
dispersion  inside  the  inter-quartile  diminished,  but  the  whisker’s 
size increased. The net effect in the dispersion is, hence, ambiguous. 
The  median  government  size  and  upper  adjacent  values  signifi-
cantly increased in the 80’s compared with the 70’s. Thereafter, in 
the 90’s there was not any relevant change  in the distribution of 
public sector size across OECD countries. Overall, the dispersion 
between the 90’s is not significantly different from that of the 70’s.  
 
There is much clear evidence of convergence in the case of produc-
tive government expenditures. In fact, Figure 1 shows that there has 
been a convergence towards the top levels of productive expendi-
tures across OECD countries in the period 1970-1997. There has 
been  a  steady  reduction  in  the  inter-quartile  range  and  in  the 
whisker’s size. The median productive government expenditure rose 
in the 80’s and to a much lower extent in the 90’s. Furthermore, the 
upper adjacent values have been stable whereas the lower adjacent 
values have considerably reduced their lag with respect to the inter-
quartile range. Indeed, the convergence of the lower adjacent values 
in the 70’s has uncovered an outside value (Mexico) which has not 
caught up. Finally, the evolution of non-productive expenditure dur-
ing the period 1970-1997 does not show any convergence pattern. 38  European Political Economy Review  
 
Figure 1 shows that there has been an increase in the share of GDP 
devoted to non-productive government expenditure for those coun-
tries  in the upper adjacent values and  in the  inter-quartile range. 
Nevertheless, the lower adjacent values have remained fairly stable 
across periods.   
 
 
 
 
Sample:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium-Luxembourg,  Canada,  Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Re-
public  of),  Mexico,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
Source:  OECD:  National  Accounts.  Volume  II:  Detailed  Tables  (various 
years), Eurostat: General Government Accounts and Statistics (various years), 
IMF: Government Finance Statistics (various years). 
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To ensure our conclusions about the convergence process, we have 
computed the -convergence usually employed in the literature on 
per capita income convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992)
3.  
 
 
Table 1: -convergence of total, productive and non-productive  
expenditures in the OECD (1970-1997) 
 
 
 
  
1970 
  
1997 
 
Variation  T2 
2   
(1) 
T3 
N(0,1) 
Total Government 
expenditure   
0.383  0.265  -30.8  6.06**  1.12 
Productive  
expenditure 
 
0.398 
 
0.248  -37.8  8.66***  1.53* 
Non-productive ex-
penditures  0.524 
 
0.492 
 
-6.1 
 
0.22 
 
0.17 
 
*, **, *** Significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: OECD: National Accounts. Volume II: Detailed Tables (various years), 
Eurostat: General Government Accounts and Statistics (various years), IMF: Gov-
ernment Finance Statistics (various years). 
 
 
In the context of our work, -convergence explores if the dispersion 
of government expenditures as a share of GDP among OECD coun-
tries has been reduced between 1970 and 1997. Dispersion is meas-
ured as the standard deviation of the logarithm of aggregate, pro-
ductive and non-productive expenditures across OECD countries in 
1970 and 1997. Moreover, we test the hypothesis that the variance 
of those expenditure has significantly decreased over time using the 
                                                 
3  The two most popular convergence measures are the -convergence and the -
convergence. The former is more restrictive than the latter. (De la Fuente, 2000) 
Indeed, -convergence could indicate convergence in situations where disper-
sion has increased because of random shocks temporarily increasing the disper-
sion or countries approaching their steady-states with higher dispersion. Evi-
dence of -convergence may also reflect Galton’s fallacy (Quah, 1993). The 
advantage of -convergence is that it allows to evaluate how do other factors af-
fect the convergence process (conditional convergence). We first analyse con-
vergence in government expenditures using the more restrictive -convergence, 
and then evaluate the impact of international economic integration in conver-
gence employing -convergence. 40  European Political Economy Review  
 
Likelihood Ratio test (T2) proposed by Carree and Klomp (1997) 
and the Variance Ratio test (T3) proposed by Lichtenberg (1994)
4.  
 
Table 1 corroborates that the dispersion in productive government 
expenditures among OECD countries has been significantly reduced 
between 1970 and 1997. Furthermore, T2-statistic and T3-statistic 
confirm  that  there  has  not  been  a  convergence  process  in  non-
productive expenditures. Interestingly, the T2-statistic indicates that 
OECD countries have significantly reduced their dispersion in pub-
lic sector size. In contrast, T3 suggests that this convergence is not 
significant. To sum up, there is evidence of convergence on produc-
tive expenditures, which is much less clear for aggregate govern-
ment expenditures and there is no evidence at all of convergence on 
non-productive expenditures. 
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the convergence in the composition of 
government expenditure. 
 
The previous section has shown that there is only clear evidence of 
absolute convergence in productive government expenditures. But 
there  still  may  be  -convergence,  which  is  less  restrictive,  on 
aggregate and non-productive government expenditures. Thus, we 
evaluate  whether  countries  that  have  higher  government 
expenditures as a share of GDP increase (decrease) this percentage 
to a lesser (greater) extent than countries with  lower government 
spending. Still, there are two types of -convergence: conditional 
and absolute. The former is, in turn, less restrictive, since it takes 
into  account  other  specific  factors  affecting  government 
expenditures. The latter requires the existence of convergence even 
without considering other variables. So, there would be conditional 
-convergence if the factors introduced in the equation along with 
the  previous  year  government  expenditure  are  significant.  In this 
case, countries converge to different steady states, conditioned by 
                                                 
4  We compute the T3 statistics taking into account that the variance in the first 
year and the variance in the last year are not independently distributed (Carree 
and Klomp, 1997). T2 and T3 tests perform better than the original test proposed 
by Lichtenberg for short time periods and small samples reducing the probabil-
ity of committing a type II error. Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  41 
these other factors affecting government expenditures. Among these 
factors  conditioning  convergence,  we  introduce  two  variables 
reflecting  the  international  economic  integration.  First,  we  include 
productive (non-productive) government expenditures  in the rest of 
the  OECD  as  a  determinant  of  productive  (non-productive) 
government  expenditures  in  each  country.  If  this  variable  is 
significant,  it  would  be  indicative  of  a  competition  among  OECD 
countries  in  growth-enhancing  (utility-enhancing)  expenditures. 
Secondly, we introduce the sum of FDI inflows in the OECD in each 
year. Thus, we analyze whether the increasing flows of FDI affects 
the  allocation  of  government  expenditure.  FDI  inflows  are  an 
appropriate variable to test the government spending implications of 
international  economic  integration.  Indeed,  the  efficiency 
hypothesis  predicts  convergence  towards  the  highest  levels  of 
productive  expenditures  and  towards  the  lowest  levels  of  social 
protection  because  of  countries  competence  for  attracting  FDI. 
Rodrik (1998) and Garret (1998) opposes this prediction based on 
the  fact  that  globalization  increases  the  perception  of  economic 
insecurity to individuals and consequently it also raises the demand 
for  social  welfare  expenditure.  Precisely,  Scheve  and  Slaughter 
(2002) show that the presence of foreign firms in the country, rather 
than trade openness, is the key aspect generating the perception of 
employment  and  economic  insecurity.  In  fact,  FDI  might  exhibit 
wild fluctuations whereas trade openness changes slowly over time. 
We take into account potential simultaneity between the government 
spending  and  the  FDI  variable,  since  multinationals  might  be 
attracted to those countries that spend more resources on productive 
expenditure. 
 
We also consider domestic variables pointed out by the literature that 
analyze  the  factors  affecting  government  expenditure:  income  per 
capita, relative prices between the public and private sector, the age 
structure  of  the  population  and  preferences  and  institutional  and 
historical factors specific to each country (Borcherding et al. 2004). 
As Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) we also introduce population to 
control for country size effects in government expenditure. Smaller 
countries have a larger share of public consumption in GDP and are 
also  more  open  to  trade  accounts.  Moreover,  smaller  countries 
might feel the competition pressure from economic integration to a 
higher extent than large countries, hence, devoting more resources 42  European Political Economy Review  
 
to  productive  expenditures.  Aggregate  government  expenditures 
will  be  also  included  as  a  factor  affecting  the  allocation  to 
productive  and  non-productive  expenditures.  Along  these  lines, 
fiscal  discipline  has  been  shown  to  affect  differently  the 
components of government expenditures (Sturm, 1998). 
5 Thus, the 
equation to estimate is: 
      ) 1 ( ln ln ln
25
1
1 , 1 , it
i
i i it t i t i it D Y G G G            

 
where G is productive, non-productive or aggregate government ex-
penditures, Y is the vector of variables reflecting international eco-
nomic integration and domestic factors that hold constant the steady 
state, D is a country dummy that takes the value 1 for country i and 0 
otherwise, subscript i=1,…25 denotes the country and t=1971,…1996 
denotes the year. Following Gemmell et al. (1999), relative prices are 
approximated by the ratio of the public sector deflator to the GDP de-
flator. The public sector deflator is the result of the weighted mean of 
the government investments deflator, public consumption deflator and 
public transfers, the latter represented by the consumer price index, all 
obtained from OECD: Economic Outlook. The per capita income (in 
Purchasing Power Parities of the 1995 dollar and in real terms of that 
year),  population  and  government  expenditure  series  are  obtained 
from  the  OECD:  National  Accounts:  Volume  I.  Main  Aggregates, 
whereas the age structure of the population is taken from the OECD: 
Labour Force Statistics. We compute permanent income per capita 
since demand is based on permanent income rather than on tempo-
rary  income  levels (Peltzman, 1980). We approximate permanent 
income per capita by taking a three-year moving average, reducing 
the sample by two observations for each country. We use panel data 
techniques using intermediate years, which avoids the choice of an 
arbitrary base year (Bernard and Durlauf, 1996). Along with FDI in-
flows, other variables might also be endogenous. If there is a com-
petition in government expenditure, then the composition of gov-
                                                 
5  Including aggregate government expenditure as a determinant of its components 
is equivalently as assuming that government expenditure is chosen in two stages. 
In the first stage aggregate government is decided. Once aggregate government 
expenditure is set up, the composition of government expenditure is chosen. 
This assumption is also usual in the literature analyzing the composition of gov-
ernment expenditure or some of its components (Sturm 1998 and Baqir, 2002) in-
cluding  those  adopting  a  consumer  demand  framework  (Tridimas,  2001)  or  a 
voter-group decision model (Borge and Rattsø, 1995). Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  43 
ernment expenditure in country i affects government expenditure in 
the rest of OECD countries.  
 
 
Table 2: -conditional convergence in total, productive and non-
productive expenditures across OECD countries (1970-1997).  
 
 
 
Dependent variable. Log of first differences in government ex-
penditures as a share of GDP: 
Determinants  Productive 
expenditures 
Non-productive 
expenditures 
Aggregate 
expenditures 
Intercept 
 
-0.339 
(-0.45) 
-2.05 
(-1.69) 
-0.376 
(-0.52) 
Log of lagged depend-
ent variable 
-0.114 
(-4.28) 
-0.263 
(-9.65) 
-0.153 
(-5.36) 
Log of total OECD 
Inflow FDI 
0.005 
(0.56) 
-0.033 
(-2.12) 
-0.022 
(-1.73) 
Log of OECD expendi-
tures 
0.332 
(3.19) 
0.190 
(2.19) 
0.212 
(2.93) 
Log of Income 
per capita 
-0.205 
(-3.06) 
0.158 
(1.98) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
Log of relative prices  0.802 
(5.08) 
1.126 
(6.55) 
0.569 
(3.07) 
Log of population  0.173 
(1.99) 
-0.173 
(-2.07) 
-0.043 
(-0.54) 
Log of government ex-
penditures 
-0.020 
(-0.25) 
0.137 
(1.83) 
 
- 
Log of population older 
than 64 (%) 
0.095 
(0.91) 
0.323 
(2.37) 
0.164 
(1.81) 
Log of population 
ounger than 15 (%) 
-0.030 
(-0.49) 
0.337 
(2.82) 
0.048 
(0.87) 
Country dummies 
H0: uk=0  k 
2   (23) 
499.50 
p-value=0.0000 
6518.26 
p-value=0.0000 
299.64 
p-value=0.0000 
N. Observations  625  625  625 
M1  -2.64  -1.84  -2.49 
M2  -1.26  -0.27  -1.21 
Hansen Test of overid. 
2   (319) 
8.49 
p-value=1.0000 
18.42 
p-value=1.0000 
16.25 
p-value=1.0000 
White t-statistics robust to heteroscedasticity are reported below coefficients. 
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Income per capita also introduces simultaneity as government ex-
penditure  and  its  composition  affect  long  run  economic  growth
6. 
Thus, the econometric analysis will be performed by means of the 
system-GMM  (GMM-SYS)  estimator  suggested  by  Blundell  and 
Bond (1998). The GMM-SYS estimator increases efficiency by ex-
ploiting all the information by estimating equation (1) in first differ-
ences and in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In the equation in 
first differences, endogenous variables are instrumented with their 
own lagged level values. In the equation in levels, endogenous vari-
ables are instrumented with their own first differences. Results from 
the one-step estimates are reported because the two-step estimates 
of  the  standard  errors  tend  to  be  severely  downward  biased 
(Arellano and Bond 1991 and Blundell and Bond 1998).  
 
As it can be seen from Table 2, the M2 tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation. Further-
more, the Hansen test statistic of over-identifying restrictions does 
not reject the validity of the instruments used. Results show that 
there  has  been  a  conditional  convergence  in  productive,  non-
productive  and  aggregate  government  expenditures  across  OECD 
countries.  Surprisingly,  the  speed  of  conditional  convergence  for 
non-productive  expenditures  is  even  higher  than  for  productive 
government  expenditures.  That  is,  non-productive  expenditures 
across  OECD  countries  is  rapidly  converging  towards  different 
steady  states.  Variables  reflecting  international  economic  integra-
tion significantly affect government size and its composition. FDI 
inflows in the OECD significantly decrease non-productive expen-
diture whereas it does not significantly affect productive expendi-
tures. Overall, FDI inflows diminish aggregate government expen-
ditures. This result may be suggesting that FDI inflows constrain 
the government’s ability to collect taxes and therefore reduces gov-
ernment expenditures. There is a growing interdependence of fiscal 
policies affecting the size and composition of government expendi-
tures. Government expenditures in each country is significantly af-
fected by government expenditures in the rest of OECD countries. 
                                                 
6  See Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller et al. (1999) for a study of the effects of 
composition of government expenditure on economic growth. This endogenous 
issue has not received much attention in empirical studies (Borcherding et al. 
2004). Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  45 
Thus, results show that there has been a race to the top on produc-
tive expenditures across OECD countries during the period 1970-
1997. Countries significantly increase their share of GDP devoted to 
productive government expenditure when there are higher levels of 
productive  government  expenditures  in  the  OECD.  In  fact,  the 
magnitude of the impact of OECD productive expenditures on each 
country’s productive expenditures is sizeable, 0.332. This finding is 
giving evidence of a competition on productive expenditures.  As 
Tanzi (2000) suggest, this competition may have the aim of attract-
ing FDI investments. OECD non-productive expenditures also sig-
nificantly raise non-productive expenditures in each country. This 
result corroborates that after controlling for other factors affecting 
non-productive  expenditures,  there  is  also  convergence  in  non-
productive expenditures.  This is reflected both in the significantly 
positive effect of non-productive expenditures of the rest of OECD 
countries and in the significantly negative effect of previous year 
non-productive expenditures. This evidence is consistent with the 
absence of absolute convergence found in the -convergence analy-
sis. There is a rapid convergence in non-productive expenditures, 
but only among countries with similar per capita income, age struc-
ture  of  the  population  and  preferences.  This  result  reflects  that 
countries such as Portugal and Spain with low social protection lev-
els but increasingly  similar economic conditions to the EU, have 
tried to reach the high social protection levels of their partners dur-
ing the period 1970-1997. These countries began to build their wel-
fare systems in the 80’s whereas others already had their welfare 
systems in place. In fact, OECD countries built their welfare sys-
tems at different stages (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997). Consistent 
with this hypothesis, results show that permanent income per capita 
significantly increases non-productive expenditures. These findings 
suggest  that  international  economic  integration  had  not  led  to  a 
“race to the bottom” on social welfare expenditure, at least until 
now.  
 
Overall,  we  find  that  international  factors  have  significantly  af-
fected changes in aggregate government expenditures. Thus, results 
show that OECD inflows have significantly decreases government 
size whereas OECD government size has increased government ex-
penditure as a share of GDP in each country. Results for domestic 46  European Political Economy Review  
 
factors are in line with the literature. We find that permanent in-
come per capita does not affect the size of government. This finding 
does not refute Wagner’s Law, since this law predicts that at some 
stage of development an upper limit for government size is reached 
(Peacock and Scott, 2000). Permanent income per capita increases 
non-productive expenditures confirming that Wagner’s law is espe-
cially  applicable  for  social  welfare.  Relative  prices  increase  the 
share of government expenditure, as predicted by Baumol’s conjec-
ture. 
7 Population  is  negatively  associated  with  aggregate  govern-
ment expenditure, as hypothesized by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) 
but not to a significantly degree. The public good character of gov-
ernment expenditure is offset by the reduction of tax prices follow 
by raises in country size (Borcherding et al., 2004). Population in-
creases productive government expenditure showing that  most of 
these expenditures are  merit goods, such as health and education 
expenditure. Moreover, this result suggests that small countries do 
not devote more resources to expenditures such as education and 
transport and communications which could shield them from glob-
alisation.  Government  size  increases  non-productive  expenditures 
suggesting that social welfare expenditure is the most expenditure-
elastic (Borge and Rattsø, 1995). Finally, the age structure of the 
population seems to be of particular relevance for non-productive 
expenditures.  As  expected,  an  elderly  population  significantly  in-
creases  non-productive  expenditures,  which  mainly  includes  social 
welfare  spending.  As  the  fraction  of  the  population  aged  65  and 
over  raises,  the  proportion  of  voters  demanding  social  security 
payments increases because the retired are net beneficiaries of these 
transfers (Lindert, 1996). Results also show that a young population 
significantly raises social security, confirming the relevance of fam-
ily and child benefits in the social welfare spending (Than Dang et 
al, 2001). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  Baumol (1967) observed that, because its low capitol-labour intensity, produc-
tivity growth was lower in the public sector than in private sector, while wage 
increase was similar. Hence, the share of government spending in GDP will 
tend to grow. Sanz: Productive Government Expenditures  47 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Slemrod (2004) shows that there has been a convergence process in 
corporate tax rates, evidencing a tax competition due to international 
competitive pressures. In this article, we have analyzed whether these 
international  competitive  pressures  have  led  to  any  government 
expenditure  competition.  The  results  obtained,  by  means  of  the 
Tukey  box-plot,  -convergence  and  conditional  -convergence, 
reveal that there is a growing fiscal interdependence among OECD 
countries. There has been a significant convergence towards the top 
levels of government productive expenditures among OECD countries 
during the period 1970-1997. The econometric analysis shows that 
OECD productive expenditures have pressured countries to increase 
their own levels of productive expenditures. This is a strong evidence 
of competition on productive expenditures among OECD countries, 
which  might  be  indicating  a  competition  to  attract  FDI.  Non-
productive  expenditures  do  not  show  any  absolute  convergence. 
Nevertheless, after controlling for factors affecting the allocation to 
non-productive expenditures, the conditional -convergence analysis 
reveals  that  there  has  been  a  rapid  conditional  convergence. 
Moreover,  international  economic  integration  seems  to  have 
influenced government expenditures  in different directions. On one 
hand, FDI inflows decrease non-productive expenditures. On the other 
hand,  OECD  non-productive  expenditures  increase  non-productive 
expenditures  in  each  country.  One  possible  explanation  for  this 
finding is that OECD high-income countries maintained their social 
protection expenditure at some level of saturation while relatively 
OECD poor countries, but increasingly converging, have tended to 
raise their protection levels. However, governments may not be able 
to  continue  financing  the  current  levels  of  social  protection  if 
international  competitive  pressure  persists.  Reducing  the  social 
welfare  system  may  diminish  the  support  for  further  international 
economic integration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2006).  
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